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RETIREMENT AS AN EFFECT  
OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
(PSOR\HUV DUH WKH NH\ DFWRUV LQ GH¿QLQJ FRQGLWLRQV IRU UHWLUHPHQW DVZHOO DV WKH FRQGLWLRQV IRU UHWDLQLQJ
employees; their role, however, is still not well recognised and expressed in theoretical frameworks. In order 
to better understand individual retirement and to design successful ageing policies we should consider the 
behaviour and attitudes of employers. 
The article presents the organisational perspective on retirement and contributes to a theoretical consideration 
of the role of employers and work environments in the retirement process. It discusses the classic economic 
approaches, including the deferred payment model, and in referring to sociology of economy and management 
sciences it presents the employer’s perspective in relations with older workers. The main goal of the article is 
to consider the retirement process as an effect of employer-employee relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the previous century the average life expectancy grew radically but the legal age of 
UHWLUHPHQWLQPRVWFRXQWULHVHLWKHUGLGQRWFKDQJHRUZDVORZHUHG6SHFL¿FDFWLRQVDLPHGDW
increasing it have been introduced only recently. Currently, such reforms have already been 
carried out or are planned in 28 out of 35 OECD countries, of which 13, including Poland, 
are postponing the retirement age to 67 (OECD 2012). It should not come as a surprise 
that a system designed over 120 years ago for an entirely different social structure requires 
adjustment to today’s conditions. However, shifting of the eligible age of retirement will not 
automatically relieve the federal budget. To avoid the costs of pensions being transferred to 
RWKHUVRFLDOFRVWVVXFKDVXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQH¿WVIRUROGHUSHRSOHSUHUHWLUHPHQWDOORZDQFHV
or disability pensions), it is necessary to increase and extend labour market activity. Until 
recently, in analysing retirement processes most researchers focused on the individual level 
and considered incentives to employees. The role of employers was often neglected, even 
though success in designing an ageing policy also depends on employers (Vickerstaff, Cox and 
Keen 2003; Henkens and van Dalen 2013). They need to be willing and capable of providing 
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opportunities for extended employment and manage an older labour force in an effective 
manner. At the same time, many opinion surveys show that employers are not necessarily in 
favour of such changes (Conen 2013). For example in Poland in 2009 only 20% of employers 
were in favour of increasing the eligible retirement age and 41% were in favour of limiting 
HDUO\UHWLUHPHQWRSWLRQV\HWERWKUHIRUPVZHUHLQWURGXFHGLQIROORZLQJ\HDUV3HUHN%LDáDV
and Turek 2011). Negative attitudes and stereotypes in a work environment can constitute 
VLJQL¿FDQWEDUULHUVWRWKHHPSOR\DELOLW\RIROGHUSHRSOH9DQ'DOHQHWDO
The article contributes to a theoretical consideration of the impact of organisational 
environment and the role of employers in shaping later stages of workers’ careers and retirement 
decisions. First, it presents the organisational perspective on retirement, focusing on retirement 
driven by company requirements. It is followed by an analysis of a classical economic approach 
in the form of the deferred payment model, pointing out its problems and limitations. Then, 
referring to sociology of economy and management sciences, the employer’s perspective on 
the older worker is described. Finally, the article discusses the model of retirement considered 
as an effect of employer-employee relations. 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RETIREMENT PROCESS  
The fundamental dimensions of analysis of the retirement process are the pension system 
DQG WKH VRFLDO VHFXULW\ V\VWHP7KH ¿UVW SURYLGHV D IUDPHZRUN IRU UHWLUHPHQW SDWKV7KH
second can offer additional motivation for leaving work in the form of disability pensions or 
pre-retirement allowances. However, in a broader perspective, the retirement process is often 
considered as an effect of SXVK and SXOO mechanisms, based on Beehr’s model (Beehr 1986; 
%HHKUHWDO+HIRFXVHGRQLQGLYLGXDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOIDFWRUVWKDWLQÀXHQFHLQGLYLGXDO
decisions and make the retirement process voluntary or involuntary. Individual factors refer, 
IRUH[DPSOHWRKHDOWK¿QDQFLDOVWDWXVSHUVRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVDQGSODQV(QYLURQPHQWDOIDFWRUV
include among others work type, pension systems, public policy and cultural norms. All of 
them can push an employee out of work, as staying in it may result in negative consequences 
(e.g. a decrease in health or satisfaction), but they can also pull one to stay in employment 
(or – from another perspective – they can pull one to retirement, e.g. by a preference to have 
more free time or engage in voluntary activities). 
Numerous studies about the retirement process have investigated a long list of such factors 
(Feldman 1994; Taylor and Shore 1995; Lumsdaine 1996; Shultz, Morton and Weckerle 1998; 
$GDPV03L362QHRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGLPHQVLRQVLVSHUVRQDO¿QDQFLDOVWDWXV
While economists focus mainly on replacement rates (the ratio of incomes and retirement 
SHQVLRQVSV\FKRORJLVWVSD\PRUHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHUDWLRRIFXUUHQWDQGIXWXUHSUR¿WVDQGFRVWV
%LGHZHOO*ULI¿QDQG+HVNHWK.U]\ĪRZVNLDQG.U]\ĪRZVNLHWDOEDVHG
on qualitative research in Poland, analyse the retirement process from the perspective of an 
individual who adapts to cultural patterns which determine the shape of social roles in older 
age. Among push and pull factors they specify health, family relations, care obligations, loss of 
MRESRVVLELOLWLHVRI¿QGLQJHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVZLWKFRZRUNHUVZLOOLQJQHVVWRWDNHDUHVW
and a need for stability and security. Other research also considers relations with a partner 
(linked retirement decisions, FIBlau 1998). Some research also shows that older workers 
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are often forced into retirement – either by cultural norms or by employers, who do not see 
any place for them or prefer to employ a retired person (which is cheaper and provides more 
ÀH[LELOLW\LQGLVPLVVDO03L36±0DQ\RIWKHSXVKDQGSXOOIDFWRUVDIIHFWLQJ
individual retirement decisions are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Some determinants in the retirement decision 
Source: own elaboration
Domination of push or pull factors in the retirement process can have consequences 
for later life satisfaction, depending on whether the post-retirement reality meets individual 
expectations. For instance, earlier retirees whose decision to leave employment was directed 
mainly by factors pulling them to the retirement have felt lower levels of depression and 
sadness than their colleagues who stayed in work, whereas early retirement driven by push 
IDFWRUVUHVXOWHGLQGHFUHDVHLQVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGGLI¿FXOWLHVLQDGMXVWPHQWWRWKHQHZVLWXDWLRQ
(Shultz et al. 1998; Greller and Simpson 1999). 
$XVHIXOIUDPHZRUNIRUDQDO\VLQJWKHUHWLUHPHQWSURFHVVSURYLGHVVSHFL¿FDWLRQRIWKUHH
structural levels (among which push/pull factors can also be considered):
í LQGLYLGXDOPLFUROHYHO±IRFXVHVRQKHDOWKFRQGLWLRQVNLOOV¿QDQFLDOVWDWXVVDYLQJV
leisure, work attitudes, work–life balance, caring responsibilities, work requirements, job 
satisfaction, retirement of a spouse, life-course phases HWF.
í V\VWHPPDFUROHYHO±UHIHUVWRSXEOLFSROLF\SHQVLRQV\VWHPUHSODFHPHQWUDWHVODERXU
market situation, culture, age norms HWF
í RUJDQLVDWLRQZRUNHQYLURQPHQWPH]ROHYHO±FRYHUVRSLQLRQVDWWLWXGHVDQGDFWLRQVRI
employers, organisation-level policy, work conditions, work atmosphere, type of work 
HWF.
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The most popular is the individual level of analysis, where the retirement is viewed mainly 
as a voluntary and employee-driven transition, as a matter of individual choice and prefer-
ences (Henkens and van Dalen 2013). A wide range of literature also focuses on the system 
SHUVSHFWLYHHVSHFLDOO\RQWKHLQÀXHQFHRISHQVLRQV\VWHPUHJXODWLRQVRQLQGLYLGXDOSUHIHUHQFHV
+DQXVKHN0DULWDWR+LQULFKV*DUFtD3pUH]-LPpQH]0DUWtQDQG6iQFKH]0DUWtQ
2013; Holzmann 2013). Very often both these levels are combined in the analysis. 
The last perspective, organisational, is least developed. Henkens and van Dalen (2013) 
HPSKDVLVHWKDWHPSOR\HUVDUHWKHNH\DFWRUVLQGH¿QLQJFRQGLWLRQVIRUUHWLUHPHQWDVZHOODVWKH
conditions for continuing work, although their role is still not well recognised or expressed in 
theoretical framework. Vickerstaff, Cox and Keen (2003), in analysing case studies of British 
companies, found that earlier retirement was mainly driven by employer requirements and the 
situation of the company, not by public policy. Thus, they conclude that the main force of any 
VLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHLQUHWLUHPHQWEHKDYLRXULVWKHHPSOR\HU,WPD\VHHPWKDWVXFKDFRQFOXVLRQ
goes too far, as analysis or retirement requires including the individual and the system as well. 
+RZHYHUXQGRXEWHGO\WKHDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXUVRIHPSOR\HUVLQÀXHQFHUHWLUHPHQWSDWWHUQV
RETIREMENT DRIVEN BY COMPANY REQUIREMENTS:  
DEFERRED PAYMENT MODEL
Consideration of retirement as a process driven by company requirements results from 
UHVHDUFKDERXWUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQWKHZRUNHU¶VSURGXFWLYLW\LQFRPHDQGDJH,W¿UVWDWWUDFWHG
the attention of economists who have been systematically investigating this relationship since 
the 1950s (FI Clark, Kreps and Spengler 1978), giving an impulse for development of the 
economy of earnings and human capital theory. 
The neo-classical economy assumed that employers are remunerated according to their 
marginal productivity (Greller and Simpson 1999). For a long time a prevailing assumption 
VDLGWKDWSURGXFWLYLW\¿UVWLQFUHDVHVWKHQGHFUHDVHVLQROGHUDJHDGRSWLQJDQLQYHUVH8VKDSH
(FISkirbekk 2004). At the same time cross-sectional and longitudinal research of income 
SUR¿OHVDFURVVDJHJURXSVPDLQO\LQWKH86VKRZHGWKDWHDUQLQJVJHQHUDOO\LQFUHDVHXQWLO
the age of 40–55 years and then stay on the same level or slightly decrease at pre-retirement 
age (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974; FI Neumark 2006). Differences were found only in the 
slope’s steepness (the pace of changes), the peak age, and the length of stabilisation period 
(and of course the nominal level of incomes), which depended on the country, work group, 
education, historical period, HWF. One of the most prominent neo-classical approaches, human 
capital theory (Mincer 1958; Becker 1964; Ben-Porath 1967), assumed that the increase in 
productivity and in income results from the continuous increase of human capital of the 
individual, although in older age they can both decrease. 
&RPELQDWLRQRIWKHWZRDJHSUR¿OHVSURGXFWLYLW\DQGLQFRPHLQGLFDWHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of a ZDJHSURGXFWLYLW\JDS – a situation when income does not match marginal productivity 
(Lazear 1979) (Fig. 2). Since the 1970s it has been a popular subject of research. According to 
the human capital theory any gap results from the costs of investment in human capital in 
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younger age, but from the perspective of the entire working life the average income equals 
productivity. However, many theoretical models from the 1970s and 1980s questioned the basic 
assumptions of human capital theory (FIPolachek and Siebert 1993). The neo-institutional 
approach in economics emphasised that productivity and incomes are not ideally correlated 
due to moderating mechanisms embedded in institutional and structural relations (Greller and 
Simpson 1999). Among them were seniority rules, according to which an increase in earnings 
DQGSURPRWLRQRIDQHPSOR\HUUHVXOWHGLQWKH¿UVWSODFHIURPWHQXUHZLWKQRRUOLWWOHUHODWLRQWR
productivity (Mincer 1974; Carmichael 1983; Hutchens 1989; Barth 1997). Such LPSOLFLWH or 
H[SOLFLWHUXOHVFRXOGEHDQHIIHFWRIWUDGHXQLRQV¶LQÀXHQFHHJ%RRWKDQG)UDQNOHJDO
regulations (e.g. in the public sector or a part of pre-retirement labour protection employment), 
tradition and culture (e.g. in Japan), or it can play a motivational role (Ilmakunnas et al. 2004). 
Most importantly, however, the wage-productivity gap meant a potential loss for 
employers. Regardless of whether it really appears or what size it reaches, even an assumption 
that it could emerge was an important barrier for the employability of older workers. It also 
had consequences for the length of the work life and for retirement, what was emphasised 
at best by the concept of GHIHUUHGSD\PHQW that stated the basis of analysing retirement as 
a process driven by the company’s requirements (Fig. 2). 
The classic deferred payment model was developed by Lazear (1979), Lazear and 
Moore (1984) and Medoff and Abraham (1980; 1981). The famous “Lazear’s contracts” 
were long-term, unwritten contracts between employer and employee. According to them, 
at the beginning of one’s career earnings are lower than the marginal productivity indicates, 
while in the last stage of employment the relation inverses. This mechanism of deferred 
payment should motivate employees to work and stay in the company. The model indicated 
H[LVWHQFHRID¿QDOSRLQWLQWLPHZKHQWKHHPSOR\HHUHWLUHVLQRUGHUWRFRPSOHWHWKHSHULRG
RIRYHUSD\PHQW6XFKFRQWUDFWVVKRXOGEHEHQH¿FLDOIRUERWKVLGHV7KHGHIHUUHGSD\PHQW
system discourages an employee from committing fraud or abuse and performing low quality 
ZRUNDVRQO\WKRVHSUR¿WDEOHDQGUHOLDEOHZLOOVWD\LQWKHFRPSDQ\DQGUHFHLYHWKHGHOD\HG
reward (FI Hutchens 1987). 
Figure 2. Deferred payment model
Source: own elaboration
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Medoff and Abraham (1980; 1981) used the mechanism of LPSOLFLWHcontracts between 
the employer and employee for explaining data from US companies, according to which 
the increase of earnings with tenure weakly correlated with productivity ratings done by 
supervisors. Later on much other research also involved this model for interpreting the results 
(e.g. Harris and Holmstrom 1982; Hutchens 1987, 1989; Barth 1997; Dustmann and Meghir 
2005). For instance, Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), based on 300,000 employment records 
from a 14-year period, interpret the observed wage-productivity gap as consistent with Lazear’s 
theory and inconsistent with Becker-Mincer’s human capital theory. 
PROBLEMS OF DEFERRED PAYMENT MODEL:  
PRODUCTIVITY, INCOME AND TIME 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Despite the long tradition of theoretical and empirical elaborations, the basic assumption 
of neo-classical economics about the trajectory of productivity and earnings, as shown in 
Figure 2, does not necessarily has to be met. First of all, research on the relationship between 
age and productivity, whether measured at the individual level or at the organizational level, 
GRHVQRWDOORZRQHWRGUDZ¿UPFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWDGURSRISURGXFWLYLW\LQROGHUDJH0HWD
analysis and extensive literature reviews indicate that although the age effect is sometimes 
REVHUYHGLWLVQRWDOZD\VVLJQL¿FDQWLQPDQ\FDVHVLWGRHVQRWRFFXUDWDOOZKHUHDVVRPH
research shows an increase in performance in older groups (McEvoy and Cascio 1989; 
Sturman 2003; Daveri and Maliranta 2007; Hellerstein, Neumark 2007; Ng, Feldman 2008). 
Age-productivity relationships cannot be easily generalised. Productivity does not depend 
on chronological age, but on a set of individual characteristics of the worker and conditions 
XQGHUZKLFKVKHRUKHZRUNV7KXVDJHDORQHGRHVQRWGLUHFWO\LQÀXHQFHSURGXFWLYLW\7KH
relation depends on (a) individual factors, (b) type of work, (c) HR management and company 
policy (FI7XUHNDQG3HUHN%LDáDV
Social psychology and management sciences usually talk about workers’ job performance 
(leaving productivity for economists, although sometimes these terms are used interchangeably). 
In the classic approach of these sciences, job performance was regarded as a function of 
capacity (related to age), willingness, and opportunity to perform (Blumberg and Pringle 
1982). Skirbekk (2004) adds an important element – productive potential – which is the result 
of individual determinants of productivity (Fig. 3).
This issue was considered even more broadly in the concept of “work ability”, developed 
in the early 1990s by the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (Ilmarinen and Tuomi 
1992; Ilmarinen 2001). Work ability is the result of the functioning of the human resources 
LQDVSHFL¿FMRE)LJ,WFDQEHSUHVHQWHGLQDIRUPRIKLHUDUFKLFDOVWUXFWXUH7KH¿UVWOHYHO
is composed of functional abilities (physical, mental, and social). The second level refers 
to competence, skills and knowledge. The third concerns values, attitudes, motivation and 
satisfaction. Finally, the fourth level is the work environment: work demands, community 
and management. Family and friendship relationships are also meaningful, as are the social, 
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political, legal, economic, and infrastructural environment. Ilmarinen and his colleagues, 
however, particularly emphasize the importance of the work environment. Until recently, 
the most common response to the growing demands of a job was to raise the level of human 
resources (e.g. by training). However, according to their concept, high work ability requires 
also improving the quality of working conditions and management.
Figure 3. )DFWRUVLQÀXHQFLQJMRESHUIRUPDQFH 
Source: Skirbekk 2004: 152
Figure 4. Work ability model
Source: Ilmarinen 2001: 549
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COSTS AND TIME 
The second problem of the deferred payment model refers to the understanding of costs 
and time. First of all, earnings are not the only cost generated by a worker. Human resources 
OLWHUDWXUHVSHFL¿HVPDQ\RWKHUW\SHVLQFOXGLQJFRVWVRIUHFUXLWPHQWDQGHPSOR\PHQWWUDLQLQJ
and development, placement, management, system costs of work (taxes), absenteeism, 
and alternative costs (e.g. cost of lost productivity during training) (Flamholtz 1999; Ng, 
)HOGPDQ,WDOVRVSHFL¿HVGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWFRVWVDQGLWGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQFRVWV
and investments. Such a broader perspective can change the curve and its relation with age, 
especially if we consider investments, as then it is necessary to include the period of return. 
As well, the temporal character of the relation between employer and employee was 
RIWHQVLPSOL¿HGZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHZDJHSURGXFWLYLW\JDS$OWKRXJK
Lazear’s model of deferred payment considered the career-time relation of productivity and 
earnings, it neglected the relationship between the particular employer and the particular 
employee and the fact that workers change jobs. Employers do not only assess the current 
marginal productivity or current costs, but consider a longer period. Therefore, what has to be 
included among the others are previous performance, expectations about future performance 
and costs, and expected period of work in the company. 
EMPLOYER’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE (OLDER) WORKER
LIMITATIONS OF EMPLOYER’S DECISIONS: EMBEDDEDNESS AND MENTAL MODELS 
Trying to specify the role of employer for retirement decisions of workers we should sketch 
out the employer’s perspective. First, we have to consider the limitations of the employer’s 
knowledge, skills and possibilities.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) offered an alternative to Lazear’s model. Rather than 
focusing on retirement, they considered the functioning of actors in a situation of incomplete 
information. The initial earnings are usually relatively low because employers do not know how 
young, newly hired employees will perform in the job. On the other hand, at the beginning of 
a career the employee does not know his or her value either. Hence, both sides have to learn 
to observe the effects of work. Importantly, Harris and Holmstrom emphasised that employers 
specify the workers’ value based on a subjective and imprecise assessment of productivity. 
Long-term contracts which average the life-time earning play a role of protection: for the 
employer, against lack of information about productivity, and for the employee, against 
short-term decreases in productivity ratings resulting in loss of income. Older workers have 
enough time to learn and prove their value and to negotiate higher earnings, at the same time 
lowering insurance costs (due to the decrease in remaining work time). As well, Bishop (1987) 
proposed replacing strong assumptions of neo-classical human capital approach by asserting 
that wages actually depend on the marginal product H[SHFWHGE\ WKHHPSOR\HUV, given the 
employer’s incomplete information. 
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The limitations of actors’ knowledge and decision-making processes has been analysed 
by sociology and psychology. One of the key concepts in the sociology of the economy 
referring to economic behaviours is HPEHGGHGQHVV(Granovetter 1985). It concerns the im-
pact of certain individual and external factors on economic activities of the individual, as 
opposed to the under-socialised vision of the individual in the most basic view of classical 
and neoclassical economics, which assumes a free market of perfectly informed sellers and 
buyers, who act fully rationally, but do not maintain any relations other than economic. 
Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) distinguished four types of embeddedness: structural, 
cognitive, cultural, and political. The central element of structural embeddedness is the 
recognition of economic relations as interpersonal relations oriented and limited by the 
network of relationships between actors and patterns of social relations. An example 
of the impact of structural embeddedness is reduction of negative age stereotypes of 
managers in highly individualized relations with familiar older people, compared to re-
lationships with new or unknown employees (Perry and Finkelstein 1999; Posthuma and 
Campion 2007). 
The cognitive dimension of embeddedness refers to the mental limitations of economic 
reasoning which cause individuals and organizations to not follow the neoclassical model 
of rationality. This leads to the adoption of the concept of bounded rationality of actions. 
One of the main limitations is the lack of complete knowledge about the current situation 
and the uncertainty of the consequences of actions. Obtaining information, if even pos-
sible, is often associated with certain costs. The process of inference is also limited by 
the cognitive capabilities of the individual, the level of information-processing skills and 
ability to make decisions. In the context of the situation of older workers, one of the main 
EDUULHUVWRMREUHWHQWLRQPD\EHWKHODFNRINQRZOHGJHDQGVNLOOVRIHPSOR\HUVLQWKH¿HOG
of age management.
Cultural embeddedness concerns the role of collectively shared interpretations in shaping 
strategies and economic goals. Culture, in the form of beliefs, ideologies, common opinions, 
and sets of norms and regulations, in fact imposes certain restrictions on the freedom of 
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVLQÀXHQFHVWKHVHOHFWLRQRIJRDOVDQGSDWWHUQVRIEHKDYLRXUDQGLPSRVHV
interpretations. For example, cultural norms are important in determining an “adequate” 
retirement age (in this context we can speak about the culture of age, FI Guillemard, Rein 
1993). This type of embeddedness also clearly reveals differences in the content of age 
stereotypes among employers from different countries (e.g. Harper et al. 2006). 
Finally, political embeddedness concerns the asymmetry of power relations between 
the actors. This asymmetry may result from legal frameworks, unequal access to resources, 
and the degree of social legitimacy. The impact of legal norms and public institutions on 
the functioning of companies is an obvious example of this kind of embeddedness. This 
perspective refers to one of the most important paradigms in research on ageing today, 
the political economy of aging (Phillipson 2006). It focuses, among others, on the ways 
a political system shapes the opportunity to engage older people in economic activity, and 
also analyses the process of dependence of older people on social policy, health systems, 
and social services.
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Social psychology introduced the concept of PHQWDO PRGHOV to describe the rules of 
reasoning for explaining behaviours of individuals and entire communities (Denzau and North 
1994; Mathieu et al. 2000). Mental models are organized knowledge structures that allow 
individuals to describe, explain and predict events. In particular, they allow one to understand 
and interact with the environment, predict and explain the behaviour of others, recognize 
the relationships between the elements of the environment, and build expectations for the 
course of events. They also affect inference and decision-making. They are often shared by 
individuals operating in the same environment (e.g. work), which allows them to collaborate 
HIIHFWLYHO\DQGHI¿FLHQWO\UHVSRQGWRFKDOOHQJHVDQGGLI¿FXOWLHV
The concepts of embeddedness and shared mental models indicate that the key elements 
in the framework for interpreting the relationship between an employer and an older employee 
are internal and external limitations. Economic activities do not happen in a social vacuum. 
6WUXFWXUDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDOLQÀXHQFHVDVZHOODVSV\FKRORJLFDOSURFHVVHV
are important for the development of the situation of older workers. 
EMPLOYEE’S VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION 
Human capital theory treats the worker and his or her work as an asset that contributes to the 
EHQH¿WVDQGFRVWVRIWKHFRPSDQ\(VWLPDWLRQRIWKHYDOXHRIDQ\W\SHRIFDSLWDOHJ¿QDQFLDO
or technological) requires one to consider what will happen with it in the future (e.g. what 
SUR¿WVZLOO LW EULQJ ,Q FDVHV RI QRQKXPDQ H[FKDQJHDEOH FDSLWDO DQ LQGLFDWLRQ LV JLYHQ
by the market price. However, human capital is not a subject of trade, thus the uncertainty 
of its value is higher (Lev and Schwartz 1971). Generally, estimation of a worker’s value 
requires one to asses (within the perspective of time) his or her productivity, promotability, 
transferability and retainability (Fitz-enz 2009: 134). In economics and management sciences 
WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VYDOXHWRDQRUJDQL]DWLRQLVRIWHQGH¿QHGDVWKHSUHVHQWYDOXHRIWKHIXWXUH
services the individual is expected to provide for the period of time the individual is expected 
to remain in the organization (Flamholtz 1999: 160).
The+XPDQ&DSLWDO$FFRXQWLQJ+&$DSSURDFKWUDQVIRUPHGWKLVNLQGRIGH¿QLWLRQLQWR
a form of analytical models. It aimed at estimations of employee’s value in real numbers – 
the so-called GLVFRXQWHGSUHVHQWYDOXHRIWKHZRUNHU, based on functions of such factors like 
expected future work performance, future costs, age, and time of retirement. For instance, in 
the classic model Lev and Schwartz (1971) used a simple equation for the human capital value 
of a person that included annual earnings (estimated with help of statistical data for sector) 
and expected age of retirement. Flamholtz (1972a; 1974/1999) proposed a more complex, 
both in mathematical and theoretical terms, model of an individual’s expected realizable 
value (Fig. 5). The value was based, LQWHUDOLD, on probability of leaving the company before 
UHWLUHPHQWDJHVDWLVIDFWLRQPRWLYDWLRQDQG¿W WR WKHSRVLWLRQ)ODPKROW]DOVRHPSKDVLVHG
that the individual’s skills and knowledge are important to the organisation only if they are 
used in a productive way (Flamholtz 1972b), therefore he included in the model motivation 
for their use (i.e. activation level).
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)LJXUH Model of employee’s value to an organisation by Flamholtz
Source: Flamholtz 1972b: 668
Morse (1973) suggested focusing on human resources of the whole organisation rather 
than on the individual human capital. It required including in the model an additional part 
responsible for the individual capacity to work as a team. 
After a period of great popularity in the academic world of the United States in the 1970s, 
the interest in HCA decreased. A rebirth was observed in the late 1980s and 1990s with the 
development of the knowledge-based economy and the increasing role attributed to the human 
capital of workers: employers were looking for support in assessing their situation and in 
management (Flamholtz, Bullen and Hua 2002). 
However, the value of HCA was often criticized (Andrade and Sotomayor 2011). Firstly, 
SUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQRIFRPSOH[PRGHOVLQDSDUWLFXODURUJDQL]DWLRQZDVRIWHQGLI¿FXOWWLPH
consuming, costly, or even impossible. Furthermore, most of these approaches (except the 
Morse model) focused on individual value, while in the modern economy the view that work is 
a team process and a worker should be assessed as a part of it dominates. Yet, the fundamental 
problem with HCA was in the assumptions required for the particular parts of equations. 
All of the models were based on the values of future behaviours and situationsH[SHFWHG by 
an employer (or HR specialist). The models at the theoretical level were more complex, as 
more assumptions were needed for mathematical predictions. Each subsequent prediction was 
exposed to additional error. Employers, like all people, have limited knowledge of place and 
time: their actions are often based on past experience, intuition, simplifying assumptions or 
)LJXUH 0RGHORIHPSOR\HH¶VYDOXHWRDQRUJDQLVDWLRQE\)ODPKROW]

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VWHUHRW\SHV3KHOSVVXJJHVWHGWKDWHPSOR\HUVVHHNWRPD[LPL]HWKHH[SHFWHGSUR¿WDQG
build expectations about employees’ future behaviour, performance and costs and according 
to these make their decisions. These expectations can be based on prevailing sociological 
beliefs (stereotypes) or on previous statistical experience, i.e. knowledge about how certain 
categories of workers normally perform at work, how they develop and what their career 
paths are. However, the economy is never fully predictable. Even when based on previous 
H[SHULHQFH WKHSUHGLFWLRQVPD\EH LQDFFXUDWH$UURZQRWLFHG WKDW¿UVW LQ WKH UHDO
labour market employers have very limited experience, and second, it is often impossible to 
measure an individual’s performance, or such measurements are inaccurate. Therefore, even 
if the employers are trying to make decisions based on knowledge, it is impossible not to 
use some kind of preconceptualization, generalization or prejudice. This can of course result 
in discrimination (Conen 2013). What is more, employers are not able to fully predict the 
consequences of their actions or reactions of employees to the change of situation in which 
they operate.
Despite the critiques, Human Accounting Models were successfully used in the practice 
RI¿UPVEXWRQO\LIXVHGZLVHO\*U|MHUDQG-RKDQVRQ,QGHIDXOWRIRWKHUVRXUFHVRI
LQIRUPDWLRQHYHU\FOXHKRZHYHULPSUHFLVHLVYDOXDEOHZKHQLWEULQJVSUR¿WV7KLVFRQ¿UPV
the rather uncontroversial conclusion that employers seek out different methods to evaluate 
HPSOR\HHVDQGDQWLFLSDWHWKHLUGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVWKH\FDQEULQJIRUWKH
company. From the employer’s point of view such strategy is rational: it reduces uncertainty, 
OLPLWV WKH¿QDQFLDO DQG WLPHFRVWVRIFROOHFWLQJGDWDDERXWHPSOR\HHV DQG IDFLOLWDWHVDQG
speeds up decision-making in the company. 
RETIREMENT AS AN EFFECT OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
Despite the inevitable margin of unpredictability, the relationship between employer 
and employee in a particular social, political and economic environment can be grasped in 
a theoretical model. The model presented in Figure 6 summarizes the process of retirement 
FRQVLGHUHG DV WKH UHVXOW RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ZRUNHU DQG HPSOR\HU LQ D VSHFL¿F
context. The employer, with his or her knowledge, experience, attitudes, opinions, plans and 
expectations (e.g. about future developments in the market and the behaviour of other actors), 
formulates expectations about the employee. On the one hand, they are based on productive 
potential, age (and other characteristics that could potentially be relevant to the employer, 
such as gender, appearance, ethnicity or sexual orientation) and employment history (all the 
knowledge that the employer may have about a particular employee). On the other hand, 
H[SHFWDWLRQVDUHLQÀXHQFHGE\WKHZRUNHQYLURQPHQWFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHVHFWRUDQGWKH
VSHFL¿FFRPSDQ\VXFKDVRUJDQLVDWLRQOHYHOSROLF\HDUQLQJVV\VWHPVDQGZRUNFRQGLWLRQV
([SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHHPSOR\HHDUHFRPSRVHGRIWKUHHIXQGDPHQWDOHOHPHQWV7KH¿UVW
one is the H[SHFWHG FRVW GH¿QHGE\ WKH HPSOR\HU WKH\ FDQ FRYHU GLIIHUHQW FDWHJRULHV RI
costs, including indirect and alternative). The second element is the H[SHFWHGSHUIRUPDQFH 
DQGDGGLWLRQDOYDOXH, which is performance understood in a broad perspective, as in social 
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psychology (Ng, Feldman 2008). It includes not only the core work tasks, but also involvement 
in the life of the organization, communication with co-workers, helping others, one’s impact 
on the team, adhering to the rules and standards, accepting the company values, as well as 
discipline and loyalty. The third element is the H[SHFWHGUHPDLQLQJWLPHRIZRUN, which can 
DOVREHGH¿QHGDVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIOHDYLQJZRUNGXHWRMREFKDQJHUHWLUHPHQWRURWKHUHYHQWV
The employer in making decisions includes the potential period in which the employee will 
EULQJSUR¿WVWRWKHFRPSDQ\)URPWKLVSRLQWRIYLHZHPSOR\HHVZKR±LQWKHPLQGRIWKH
employer – will not leave the company in the near future have a higher value. 
Figure 6. Retirement as an effect of employer-employee relations
Source: own elaboration. 
Based on these three components, the employer constructs something management 
sciences (e.g. Flamholtz 1999) call WKH H[SHFWHGYDOXHRIWKHHPSOR\HHWRWKHHPSOR\HU, i.e. 
the present value of expected future services the employee will provide in the period in which 
he or she is expected to work for the organization. Expectation of declining performance of 
an older worker and rising or stable wages can lead to the expectation of a wage-productivity 
Figure 6. Retirement as an effect of employer-employee relations 
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gap, which means losses for the company. This can result in actions pushing the older 
worker into retirement. Employers who prefer younger or middle-aged workers will not 
be as willing to invest in the development of employees approaching retirement age, nor 
in age management, career planning or training programs. The reduction of the number of 
ROGHUZRUNHUVFDQEHVHHQDVDQHIIHFWLYHWRROLQVROYLQJWHPSRUDU\¿QDQFLDOSUREOHPVDQG
lowering labour costs (Taylor and Walker 1998). In the case of older workers an unfavourable 
approach of employers may negatively affect their well-being, decrease motivation to work, 
DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\GHFUHDVHSHUIRUPDQFHDQGDVD¿QDOVWHSLWFDQUHVXOWLQWKHGHFLVLRQWR
retire as soon as possible. This creates a vicious cycle, negatively affecting both sides of 
the employment contract. It may also adversely affect the prospects of older job seekers. 
A different character of this relationship (based on favourable approach to ageing staff) can 
bring the opposite effect. Therefore, attitudes and actions of employers are a central element 
of the analysis of retirement process at the organizational level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The article proposes considering the retirement process as an effect of employer-employee 
UHODWLRQV,WLVRIDWKHRUHWLFDOFKDUDFWHUEXWHYLGHQFHRQWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIHPSOR\HUHPSOR\HH
relations for retirement decisions is found in the literature. Research in Poland has shown 
that employers’ opinions about the lower productivity of older workers correlated with 
organizational policies aimed at pushing older workers to retirement, while positive opinions 
FRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHSROLF\RIDFWLYHDJHPDQDJHPHQW3HUHN%LDáDVDQG7XUHN7XUHN
3HUHN%LDáDV6LPLODUUHVXOWVKDYHEHHQIRXQGLQRWKHUFRXQWULHV&RQHQ+HQNHQV
van Dalen 2013). However, the role of employers in retirement decisions is still underestimated 
DQGUHTXLUHVIXUWKHUUHVHDUFK7KHSHQVLRQV\VWHPWKDWGH¿QHVH[LWVFKHPHVDQGWKHHOLJLEOH
retirement age is the fundamental tool shaping retirement processes; however, employers are 
WKHNH\DFWRUVLQGH¿QLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUUHWLUHPHQWDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUZRUNLQJ
longer. In order to better understand individual decisions about leaving the labour market in 
older age we should consider the role of the employer. As well, the success of public policies 
aimed at increasing the effective exit age depends to a large extent on the actions and attitudes 
of employers. Their behaviour results not only from economic calculations and a fully 
rational assessment of the situation, but also from stereotypes, prejudices, mental models, 
and knowledge and limitations of the social, political and cultural reality. An expected (by 
the employer) decrease in job performance and developmental potential, expected increase of 
costs and shortening remaining career time contributes to the diminishing future value of the 
ageing worker. It can lead to adverse mechanisms. For employers, low productivity of older 
workers means potential costs and losses. For employees, a negative attitude and reluctance 
of employers can adversely affect their professional situation and opportunities in the labour 
market. This means that regardless of the real potential, productivity and retirement plans 
of a worker, the employer’s opinions have an impact on the work situation and retirement 
decisions. 
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